Pimpl class Impl is stored in raw pointers which are allocated on the heap in
the constructor. However, the constructor can throw an exception resulting in a
memory leak as the destructor is **not** invoked.
=> A smart pointer is however properly deallocated.
We also changed the way in which we copy the DLLs to the bin folder inside the build directory.
Before we were directly placing the conan-deps DLLs into the bin folder directly. Now we place
them into a directory called conanDlls, and from there we copy them to bin or install/bin
at build and install steps respectively.
CVE-2017-1000126 is a Stack out of bounds read in the WebP parser caused by the
parameter size & filesize being too large, causing the parser to land in an
infinite loop and eventually crash. Enforcing that the size over which the
parser iterates is smaller than the file fixes this issue.
This fixes#175.
The webp header contains the filesize of the image starting at the 8th byte in
bytes 4 to 8 encoded as a little endian 32 bit unsigned integer. The code was
erroneously assuming that the extracted filesize is starting at the 12th byte,
i.e. at the end of the WebP file header.
Source: https://developers.google.com/speed/webp/docs/riff_container
enforce is a function comparable to assert(), it ensures that a condition is
true. However, while assert() should be used for conditions where we can be
certain that they are true, enforce is intended to be used for conditions that
can fail (like on invalid input). Therefore enforce() throws an exception when
the condition is false and does not abort the program's execution. Also, it is
not turned off by defining NDEBUG.
- add a new file enforce.hpp
- implement enforce()
- templated structs were not required, SFINAE works for functions too
=> use instead, removes some unneeded code
- fix non-usage of builtins with clang
- adjust unit tests
The fallback signed integer overflow check is quite expensive, but the addition
can be safely performed when saved in an int due to integer promotion
rules. This makes the check a little less expensive.
- cdataBuf must be at least 8 bytes long otherwise decodeIHDRChunk
reads out of bounds
- pngImage::readMetadata now skips png chunks where the offset for
IHDR chunks is invalid
- added assertion into PngChunk::decodeIHDRChunk() to ensure dataBuf
size
When parsing a subBox that is a ColorHeader, a length is extracted
from the input file and fed directly into DataBuf() (which calls
malloc). A crafted input file can provide arbitrarily (up to
max(uint32_t)-8) large values and result in excessive memory
allocation.
This commit adds a check for the new size of DataBuf so that it is not
larger than the remaining size of the file.
This fixes#202 aka CVE-2018-4868
- consider that key is advanced by 8 bytes if stripHeader is true
=> length is reduced by same amount
Fixed by adding offset to the check in the loop
- Rewrote loop so that keysize is checked before the next
iteration (preventing an out of bounds read)
This change define explicitly the behavior that exiv2::getEnv should have
on response to unexpected inputs.
There are some other minor changes:
- Use _putenv_s for the unit tests on Windows
- Add todo comment
- Remove deprecated note about freeing memory
